by Mark Beyer
Any review of John Bolton’s “Surrender is Not an Option: Defending America at the United Nations and Abroad” could without great effort slump into ad hominem attacks of this former US Ambassador to the United Nations. In fact, I’m sure some will. Bolton is an easy target, given his inflammatory rhetoric about and disdain for the United Nations, “foreigners,” his former subordinates, or anyone else who has challenged his ideas for American supremacy. These ideas, it must be pointed out, would seem by his own words to be instituted at any costs to our republic. I won’t attack Bolton personally here; it’s enough to let the man’s words describe what kind of career policy maker and diplomat he has been.
On foreign affairs, Bolton is clear:
Foreigners, even some supposed allies, cannot be trusted, and the hostile ones (North Korea, Iran, the enemies of Israel, and others) will always cheat, will never abide by an agreement, and only understand pressure and force.
With such people there should be only sticks and hard words, no carrots, no rewards for good behavior, and no prolonged negotiations. Force always remains an option.
I wondered, while reading such remarks, how Bolton thought “foreigners” might view the United States when itself did not—or ceased to—abide by international agreements. As undersecretary of state for arms control and international security affairs in G.W. Bush’s first administration term, Bolton was in perfect place to abrogate many agreements. He devised the plan to withdraw the US from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, calling it “a Cold War relic that essentially precluded the US from developing national missile defense systems.” He was instrumental in quashing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty on nuclear arms testing. Bolton also tried mightily, and with some success, to hamper a UN initiative to limit sales of small arms and light weapons, the preferred weapons of radicals, dictators, and mercenary killers around the world (one must remember that the United States stands in the top five of military weapons manufacture and sales worldwide, including to those who have come to harm us, including Iraq, Iran, Osama bin Laden (pre-Al Queada), the Taliban and North Korea). Or consider Bolton’s role in “unsigning” the United States’ agreement to establish the International Criminal Court ( falling short, however, of ratifying the Rome Statute, which served to set up the court): “My happiest moment at State” Bolton writes.
Evidently, an agreement is solid to Bolton only if he and like-minded ideologues have engineered them for the wholesale benefit of the United States alone. Bolton defends doing away with these treaties and agreements (remember, he has previously said foreigners and even allies “will always cheat” and “never abide by an agreement” ) by claiming, “We were simply rejecting inferior policies and agreements, and replacing them with greater American independence and fewer unnecessary constraints.”
And some people actually wonder why Iran and North Korea say they “need” to build nuclear weapons to forestall American hegemony and aggression towards them. Such wonderment is pig ignorance, in my opinion. Whatever else radical regimes might be, they do have eyes attached to their ideological convictions. When they see American military muscle on home turf, or next door, what they see are “foreigners” with hostile intentions. Ethics cut both ways. The worst of the outcome over such cheating and agreement breaking are years in the making—for all parties to these treaties and those observing from the sidelines. Suddenly I hear a resounding echo: You shall reap what you sow.
Yet, with all of his ideas laid out now for the public to read and understand, Bolton’s opinions should be taken seriously. I think they have merit—just not in this or the last century. We live in a much closer world community than that of the 19th Century, when such self-interest ideology was ubiquitous in the world.
Attacks on Bolton’s character came aplenty during his Senate confirmation hearings for the UN ambassadorship, and subsequently (following his confirmation defeat and, then, Bush’s arrogate insertion of Bolton in the post as a “recess appointment” when the Senate was on summer vacation) as the Ambassador to the institution for which he had previously and famously showered such hatred upon. For what Bolton said about the UN, he definitively put into action: upon landing in New York just a month before the UN’s 60th anniversary, when a summit meeting of heads of state and government was to take place, Bolton read and made 700+ amendments to the summit’s draft declaration—changes he considered vital to assuring the increased influence the United States should have on the UN, and reflect its self interests.
You see, Bolton didn’t care for the UN’s citation of the world’s problems, or the UN delegations, or the UN Secretariat, or the UN Secretary General, Koffi Annan. As might be expected, Bolton’s proposed changes caused resentment among a hundred or so countries, which proved to re-ignite quarrels that had already been successfully resolved. One amendment Bolton insisted upon was to strike any mention of the Millennium Development Goals to eradicate global poverty. Perhaps Bolton didn’t think poverty should be eradicated—God knows we don’t need any more people who can contribute to the global economy; or perhaps he didn’t think the UN’s structure of this goal was sound. He doesn’t say; nor does he offer a viable counter option to eradicating poverty. He does say this, however:
United States interests alone are to be considered paramount; the United Nations is only relevant insofar as it serves those interests.
America’s standing in the world fell dramatically under Bolton’s UN ambassadorship. Bolton held firm. Anyone who attacked Bolton’s character was, in my opinion, quite wrong. For Bolton in fact showed steal-core character by not folding to the pressures of pundits, “foreigners,” the diplomatic mission of the UN, and ultimately not to the Bush administration’s own softening on its original ideological plan for the United States’ policy toward its foes and friends across the globe.
Bolton quit his UN post in late 2006, when it became obvious that a new Senate confirmation hearing on his UN tenure would basically throw him out. Bolton claimed as his face-saving exit strategy the Bush administration’s weakening stance on hitherto unbridled unilateralism and softened stances against Iran and North Korea: he would better serve America’s interests by “keep firing” from outside government. Bolton now works with the American Enterprise Institute. He is yet seen as an expert on conservative government policy issues, and has been a guest on the Sunday morning political talk show circuit. Such expertise has given him the wherewithal to encourage Israel, recently (as quoted in The New York Sun during a conference in Herzliya) “that the Bush administration is unlikely to act to halt Tehran’s nuclear race, and he urged Jerusalem to strike militarily.” Yes, a very enterprising thought.
As far as Bolton’s warrior stance towards the world’s despotic regimes go, he has certainly not been eager to use his own brawn or blood (or his family’s) in efforts at regime change: he ducked out of service in Vietnam, even though he supported the war. He was attending Yale at the time, and dodging the draft was more practical than the inconvenience of fighting for one’s country, so he “wasn’t going to waste time on a futile struggle.” Instead, he joined the the National Guard, than an easy duty to escape combat (unlike the 45% of the US Iraq occupation force today composed of guardsmen). This echoes both George W. Bush’s and Dick Cheney’s draft dodging schemes (Cheney said of his draft-dodging decision: “I had other priorities in the ‘60s than military service.”). Bravo! (Quick side note: John Bolton has a college-age (military-serving age) daughter who attends Yale. Funny how we haven’t seen her in fatigues storming some Baghdad hell-hole.)
Bolton so hates the UN, that in “Surrender Is Not an Option,” he never gives the organization credit for its advancement of peace and democracy. You don’t learn, for example, that the UN went into Iraq after the US invasion to establish the first Iraqi Governing Council; Bolton fails also to describe the UN’s organization of Iraq’s elections; and one grievous omission is that Sergio Vieria de Mello—a career diplomat with invaluable service to peace and reconciliation between parties worldwide—and 15 of his UN staff were killed by a truck bomb in August 2003. Did Bolton omit de Mello’s particularly bright service because Bolton so despised Secretary General Annan? We don’t know exactly, but some of his worst condemnations come at the expense of Koffi Annan, a person whom Bolton dismisses with the phrase “[he] was simply not up to the job”; a statement given without explanation or proof—and despite contradictory opinion by world leaders.
“Surrender is Not an Option: Defending America at the United Nations and Abroad” is a flawed book, not for Bolton’s convictions about America’s need for safety, defense, or its continued ability to operate within both spheres vis-a-vis the larger world stage. These are vital concerns and of the utmost importance to the United States; the US has proceeded since the post-World War II era to act according to its self-interest when it could not get other countries to agree on a solution to a given problem, just as other countries, allies and enemies alike, have so to acted in their self interest. There’s nothing new in this area; what is striking, however, is how Bolton—under the aegis of the Bush administration and with full backing—have either bullied and blackmailed countries into going along with “the American plan” or simply ignored outside opinion entirely. This is not diplomacy; this is imperialism.
The book is flawed because Bolton proves to be a mean spirited, if not wholly angry man. He continuously uses name-calling and ad hominem attacks, employing such pointless yet loaded terms as Matress Mice, Candle Lighters, The Weak-kneed, High Minded, The True Believers, Crusaders of Compromise, and Euroids. Hereby, Bolton shows a bitchy willingness to engage in slur-sloganeering used otherwise by (and to gather together) the far-right-wing base groups. Perhaps this is because he has not, ultimately, defeated his opponents.
Is this what we expect from a diplomat? I surely don’t hope so. The way Bolton (and the Bush administration) has treated the world’s governments—his abject arrogance of superiority coupled with a distinctive poverty of imagination to usher the world forward to a better place than war and power-struggles—make the sub-title of his book a more difficult process for those future, reasonable administrations to achieve.